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I. INTRODUCTION
The home mortgage interest deduction, “America’s favorite tax break,”1
should come to a necessary and deserved end in any comprehensive tax
reform package Congress adopts.2 With fundamental tax reform touted
as a vehicle for increasing economic competitiveness, lowering tax rates,
closing part of the federal budget deficit, and making tax compliance
simpler,3 members of both major political parties are scrutinizing costly

1. Jeanne Sahadi, Mortgage Deduction: America’s Costliest Tax Break, CNN
MONEY (Apr. 15, 2010, 4:11 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/04/14/pf/taxes/mortgage_
interest_deduction/index.htm. An early 2012 poll commissioned by the National
Association of Home Builders found that 73% of likely voters support keeping the
deduction in the tax code. Alan Zibel, Poll: Don’t Tread on My Mortgage-Interest
Deduction, WALL ST. J. DEV. BLOG (Jan. 11, 2012, 6:34 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
developments/2012/01/11/poll-dont-tread-on-my-mortgage-interest-deduction. That being
said, other polls show Americans may be willing to forgo many tax deductions, including
the mortgage interest deduction, if the result would be substantially lower tax rates. See
Ben Steverman, A Taxing Debate: The Mortgage-Interest Deduction, BLOOMBERG (Oct.
18, 2011, 8:13 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-17/a-taxing-debate-themortgage-interest-deduction.html.
2. See infra Part III. For a brief discussion of how bad provisions make their way
into the tax code and rarely ever go away, see BERNARD SALANIÉ, THE ECONOMICS OF
TAXATION 156–57 (1st ed. 2003) (explaining that legislators have an incentive to make
tax burdens and benefits so hard for the public to understand that populist opposition to
the tax system cannot emerge).
3. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, 100 MILLION UNNECESSARY RETURNS: A SIMPLE, FAIR,
AND COMPETITIVE TAX PLAN FOR THE UNITED STATES 3 (2008) (“[T]he minimal requirement
for a tax system should be that it raises sufficient revenue to pay for government
expenditures. A good tax system ought to do so fairly, keeping its costs of compliance
and administration as low as feasible. It ought to be conducive to economic growth.
Finally, it ought to . . . interfer[e] minimally with private decision making. Our nation’s
tax system fails on every count.”).
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tax carve-outs like the mortgage interest deduction.4 The deduction makes
a compelling target. Tax policy experts on both the left and right agree
that the mortgage interest deduction fails to meaningfully increase the
homeownership rate despite the substantial subsidy for many homeowners.5
Rather than helping renters on the cusp of ownership purchase a home,6
the mortgage interest deduction merely subsidizes those who would
likely buy homes without a subsidy.7 These large subsidies for only a
portion of homeowners carry harmful secondary social and economic
effects.8 Homeowners with the deduction, for instance, can purchase
larger, more expensive homes than they would otherwise.9 And where
housing stock is limited, that subsidized demand drives housing inflation
and actually reduces homeownership rates among almost all socioeconomic
groups.10 The inducement to purchase larger homes on larger lots also
spurs overdevelopment of traffic-causing, open-space-razing suburban
sprawl.11

4. See Steverman, supra note 1. In July 2011, the Republican Chairman of the
House Ways and Means Committee, Representative Dave Camp, and the Democratic
Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, Senator Max Baucus, held a joint hearing
on the tax treatment of debt and equity. For the announcement and witness statements,
see Tax Reform and the Tax Treatment of Debt and Equity: J. Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Ways and Means & S. Comm. on Fin., 112th Cong. (2011) (publication
forthcoming), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/Calendar/EventSingle.aspx?
EventID=250212. Leaders in both parties, however, remain purposely vague on tax
reform details and how they would address politically difficult provisions like the
mortgage interest deduction. See G.I., The Devil’s in the Details (and the Politics),
ECONOMIST FREE EXCHANGE BLOG (Feb. 22, 2012, 9:46 PM), http://www.economist.com
/blogs/freeexchange/2012/02/tax-reform?page=3.
5. See Robert C. Pozen, The Mortgage Interest Deduction Needs To Be Slashed,
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0328
_mortgage_interest_deduction_pozen.aspx; Jonathan Williams, The Battle of the Home
Mortgage Interest Deduction, TAX FOUND. TAX POL’Y BLOG (Oct. 17, 2005), http://
taxfoundation.org/blog/battle-home-mortgage-interest-deduction; see also Zibel, supra
note 1 (indicating “most economists” see the mortgage interest deduction as wasteful
spending through the tax code).
6. See Edward L. Glaeser & Jesse M. Shapiro, The Benefits of the Home Mortgage
Interest Deduction, 17 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 37, 40 (2003).
7. Roberta F. Mann, The (Not So) Little House on the Prairie: The Hidden Costs
of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1347, 1361–62 (2000).
8. See id. at 1384; Christian A. L. Hilber & Tracy M. Turner, The Mortgage
Interest Deduction and Its Impact on Homeownership Decisions 22 (Spatial Econ.
Research Ctr., Discussion Paper 55, 2010), available at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/31759/1/
sercdp0055.pdf.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 90–95.
10. Hilber & Turner, supra note 8, at 22.
11. Mann, supra note 7, at 1384.
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In spite of the mortgage interest deduction’s shortcomings, congressional
policymakers are understandably reluctant to reform it.12 Beyond anxiety
about changing a popular tax break, Congress must also worry that
reforming the deduction will affect the already-battered housing market,13
as well as homeowners who rely on the deduction each year.14 Those
considerations should not, however, stop Congress from reforming the
mortgage interest deduction. Rather, Congress should use tax reform as
an opportunity to set the housing market on a more sustainable long-term
path and prevent the next housing crisis, in part by reforming the mortgage
interest deduction.15 This future benefit need not result in immediate pain;
Congress can reform the mortgage interest deduction and protect the
short-term housing market by adopting appropriate transition relief.16
This Comment argues that Congress should—in this order of
preference—eliminate the mortgage interest deduction, replace it with a
credit, or substantially modify it, and that Congress can adopt any of
these policies without substantial short-term fallout in the housing

12. For example, Senators Ron Wyden and Dan Coats’s bipartisan tax reform bill,
which is explicitly aimed at eliminating a slew of deductions and lowering tax rates,
retains the itemized deduction for mortgage interest. See Bipartisan Tax Fairness and
Simplification Act of 2011, S. 727, 112th Cong. § 2(1)(B) (2011). Why? Perhaps
because of the popular view that any lawmaker’s attempt to eliminate the mortgage
interest deduction would be “political suicide.” Paul Sullivan, Despite Critics, Mortgage
Deduction Resists Change, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2011, at F4.
13. In early 2012, property values were at a postbubble low, with the average
home price one-third lower than what it was in 2006. Press Release, Fiserv, Inc., Fiserv
Case-Shiller Home Price Insights: Home Prices Reach New Low, but Stabilization and
Recovery Are in Sight (Jan. 30, 2012), http://investors.fiserv.com/releasedetail.cfm?
ReleaseID=643558. Despite decreases in the foreclosure rate from the previous year and
previous quarter, foreclosure starts in the second quarter of 2012 were at 0.96%, near
double the long-term average of 0.5%, while the percentage of loans in foreclosure was
4.27%, near the postbubble high and far from the long-term average of about 1.2%.
Press Release, Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, Mortgage Delinquencies Increase in Latest MBA
Survey (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.mbaa.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/81589.htm;
Press Release, Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, Delinquencies and Foreclosures Decline in Latest
MBA Mortgage Delinquency Survey (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.mortgagebankers.org/
NewsandMedia/PressCenter/79827.htm. For more detail on the state of the housing
market and its importance to the nation’s economy, see infra Part III.F.2.
14. See Steverman, supra note 1. In 2008, over 70% of homeowners with mortgages
claimed the deduction. Sahadi, supra note 1.
15. See ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, THE GREAT AMERICAN HOUSING BUBBLE: THE
ROAD TO COLLAPSE 131–37 (2011) (discussing the inflationary role the mortgage interest
deduction plays in the housing market and identifying it as “the tax provision which
contributed most to the American Housing Bubble (and thus also to its ultimate
collapse)”). Because of the societal difficulty identifying and seriously addressing
speculative bubbles while they are occurring, the only effective strategy is for
policymakers to target the conditions that create such bubbles in the first place. ROBERT
J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION: HOW TODAY’S GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS HAPPENED,
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 3–4 (2008).
16. See infra Part IV.A.3, B.3, C.3.
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market. Part II of this Comment examines how the mortgage interest
deduction works, its history, and its intended benefits. Part III scrutinizes
the deduction’s inability to achieve its primary objective—increasing
homeownership—and examines its negative effects on housing prices,
household indebtedness, the environment, and wealth disparity.
Accordingly, this Part argues that Congress should reform the deduction,
discusses three basic options available for doing so, and introduces the
long-term and short-term considerations that Congress must account for
when adopting a new policy. Part IV discusses each of Congress’s general
options—eliminating the deduction, replacing it with a credit, or
substantially modifying the deduction—and analyzes each option in light
of continued housing market weakness. Ultimately, the analysis in
Part IV concludes that Congress should reform the mortgage interest tax
deduction by completely phasing it out over a number of years, with a
trigger for the phase-out based on a metric of housing market health.
Part V summarizes how completely phasing out the deduction will
accomplish the twin objectives of long-term housing market health and
accommodating the market’s current fragility.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION
A. How the Deduction Works
The Internal Revenue Code (the Code) only permits deductions for
one type of personal debt, “qualified residence interest.”17 The Code
defines qualified residence interest as interest arising from “acquisition
indebtedness” or “home equity indebtedness” on a qualified residence.18
Acquisition indebtedness is purchase, construction, or improvement debt
that is secured by a qualified residence.19 Home equity indebtedness is
any nonacquisition indebtedness secured by the residence that does not
exceed the difference between the fair market value and the acquisition

17. I.R.C. § 163(h) (2006).
18. Id. § 163(h)(2)(D), (3)(A).
19. Id. § 163(h)(3)(B)(i). Common examples would be a fixed- or variable-rate
mortgage to purchase a home or a second mortgage a homeowner uses to remodel.
Acquisition indebtedness can also include debt remaining after refinancing a loan, but
only to the extent of the unpaid principal before the homeowner refinanced. William T.
Mathias, Curtailing the Economic Distortions of the Mortgage Interest Deduction, 30 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 43, 47 (1996) (citing I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)).
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indebtedness.20 Under the Code, a homeowner can deduct interest on up
to $1 million in acquisition indebtedness21 and the first $100,000 in home
equity indebtedness.22 Thus, a homeowner can potentially deduct interest
on up to $1.1 million of home-secured debt.23 However, the tax privilege
for mortgage debt is not limited to a taxpayer’s principal residence alone; a
“qualified residence” includes both a taxpayer’s principal residence and
one other residence selected by the taxpayer.24
As a tax deduction, the mortgage interest deduction does not reduce
tax liability dollar-for-dollar, as tax credits do.25 Instead, a deduction
reduces taxable income by an amount directly proportional to a taxpayer’s
income tax rate.26 Consider the following example: On January 1, 2011,
Alice and Ben each purchased a home with a $200,000 mortgage at 5%
interest. The interest cost to each taxpayer was $10,000 in the first year.
Alice made $100,000 in 2011 and paid at the 28% tax rate, whereas Ben
made $50,000 and paid at the 15% tax rate. Under the mortgage interest
deduction, Alice received a tax benefit of 28% of $10,000, or $2,800.
Ben received a tax benefit of 15% of $10,000, or $1,500. In other words, of
every dollar Alice spent on mortgage interest, the federal government
gave twenty-eight cents back to her, while Ben received only fifteen
cents back for every dollar he spent on mortgage interest in 2011.27
20. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(C)(i). An example would be a loan of $50,000 secured by a
residence where the market value of the residence is $500,000 and the amount of
acquisition indebtedness is $450,000. Unlike acquisition indebtedness, home equity
indebtedness is not limited in what the proceeds may be used for. See id. § 163(h)(3)(C).
It was this “interest-free” home equity cash homeowners used during the housing bubble
to finance cars, boats, SUVs, wide-screen televisions, vacations, et cetera. See AARON
CLAREY, BEHIND THE HOUSING CRASH: CONFESSIONS FROM AN INSIDER 27 (2008).
21. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii).
22. See id. § 163(h)(3)(C)(ii).
23. See id. § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii), (C)(ii). For perspective on this amount, the median
home price at the peak of the housing market was $262,600, while the average price was
$329,400. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MEDIAN AND AVERAGE SALES PRICES OF NEW HOMES
SOLD IN UNITED STATES 11 (2011) [hereinafter U.S. HOME SALE PRICES], available at
http://www.census.gov/const/uspricemon.pdf.
24. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(4)(A)(i). However, a household with two qualified residences
may not deduct interest on debt exceeding an aggregated amount of $1.1 million between
the two residences. See id. § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii), (C)(ii).
25. See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Geithner, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1051,
1060–61 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (explaining the differences between tax credits and deductions).
For a detailed example of the difference between tax credits and tax deductions, see infra
pp. 1366–67.
26. See Freedom from Religion Found., 715 F. Supp. 2d at 1061 (explaining the
influence of tax rates on the value of deductions).
27. See CHUCK MARR & BRIAN HIGHSMITH, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES,
REFORMING TAX EXPENDITURES CAN REDUCE DEFICITS WHILE MAKING THE TAX CODE
MORE EFFICIENT AND EQUITABLE: RECENT PROPOSALS UNDERSCORE BIPARTISAN SUPPORT
FOR REFORM 5 (2011), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/4-15-11tax.pdf (discussing
the same disparity demonstrated by different example).
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Accordingly, the higher one’s income tax rate, the greater the proportional
benefit from the deduction.28
To claim the mortgage interest deduction, taxpayers must itemize their
taxes, which is only financially worthwhile if their total itemized deductions
exceed the value of the standard deduction.29 Returning to the example
of Alice and Ben, both taxpayers would itemize for tax year 2011 because
the $10,000 of mortgage interest they paid exceeds the standard deduction,
which was $5,800 for single taxpayers.30 Cynthia, a taxpayer who also
purchased a home in 2011 with a $100,000 mortgage, a 5% interest rate,
and thus $5,000 in mortgage interest, would only itemize if she had other
deductions totaling more than $5,800. For Cynthia, the mortgage interest
deduction provides no value unless combined with other deductions.31
This barrier—the need for itemized deductions to exceed the standard
deduction—prevents nonitemizing homeowners from actually benefitting
from the mortgage interest deduction.32
B. History of the “Accidental Deduction”33
In 2013, the mortgage interest deduction will celebrate its one hundredth
anniversary as part of the federal tax code.34 Contrary to what its long
history might suggest, the mortgage interest deduction is more a by-product
of the nation’s agrarian past than a longstanding policy preference for

28. See id.
29. Robert Lepore, Note, Bringing Balance to the Budget Debate: Challenging the
Privileged Procedural Status of Regressive Tax Expenditures over Progressive Discretionary
Spending Programs, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 103, 107–08 (2010).
30. See Rev. Proc. 11-12, 2011-2 I.R.B. 297, 299, available at http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-irbs/irb11-02.pdf (stating 2011 standard deduction for individuals).
31. See Tax Reform Options: Incentives for Homeownership: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Fin., 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter Hearing] (publication forthcoming),
available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/hearing/?id=279c1381-5056-a0325260-1ce326dfc82b (statement of Dr. Richard K. Green, Director, Lusk Center for Real
Estate, University of Southern California).
32. PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND PROGROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA’S TAX SYSTEM 72 (2005). For a discussion of
how this itemization barrier shifts benefits of the mortgage interest tax deduction away
from lower income and middle class homeowners, see infra notes 75–76 and accompanying
text.
33. For the article originating this moniker, see Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Accidental
Deduction: A History and Critique of the Tax Subsidy for Mortgage Interest, 73 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 233 (2010).
34. See Tariff of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, § 657, 38 Stat. 114, 167 (current version
at I.R.C. § 163(h) (2006)).
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subsidizing homeownership.35 From 1913 until passage of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, all interest payments, whether related to personal or business
expenses, were deductible.36 At the root of this across-the-board
deductibility was a conflict between congressional tax policy and the
practical limitations of the tax collection and reporting system in the
early 1900s.37 Congress in 1913 sought to encourage business investment
by allowing individuals to deduct interest from business-related debt.38
However, the inability to easily distinguish between personal and business
assets in the early twentieth century made it less administratively
burdensome to permit deductions for interest on all loans.39 Use of the
deduction for mortgage interest would have been de minimis at that time
because few taxpayers had any tax liability and those that did typically
purchased their homes with cash.40
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 did away with the broad deduction for
personal interest but maintained a specific deduction for mortgage interest.41
Although history might show the mortgage interest deduction to be a

35. See Mann, supra note 7, at 1351–52 & 1352 n.17.
36. Id. at 1352. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 disallowed deductions for “personal
interest,” which is anything other than nonemployee business or trade interest, investment
interest, passive activity interest, qualified residential interest, or interest related to tax
payments. See Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 511, 100 Stat. 2085, 2246 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 163(h)(1)).
37. See Mann, supra note 7, at 1352 n.17.
38. See id.; see also Tariff of 1913 § 657 (“[I]n computing net income for the
purpose of the normal tax there shall be allowed as deductions . . . all interest paid within
the year by a taxable person on indebtedness . . . .”).
39. Mann, supra note 7, at 1352 n.17.
40. HARDAWAY, supra note 15, at 132. Further, the homeownership rate between
1910 and 1920 was under fifty percent. Historical Census of Housing Tables—
Homeownership, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/
historic/owner.html (last revised Oct. 31, 2011).
41. See HARDAWAY, supra note 15, at 134 (“While this plan did indeed succeed in
both simplifying the tax code while reducing tax rates, it left largely untouched the 800
pound gorilla tax deduction in the form of the home mortgage deduction . . . .”); Mann,
supra note 7, at 1352. Whereas the Code treats mortgage interest differently from
interest on other personal debt, courts in bankruptcy actions characterize mortgage debt
as consumer debt and thus consider it subject to the same kind of abuse as other personal
debts. See, e.g., In re Price, 353 F.3d 1135, 1138–39 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming the
lower court’s dismissal of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case on grounds that the individual
primarily had consumer debt and that granting relief in light of the consumer debt would
constitute substantial abuse of Chapter 7). It is especially peculiar Congress retained the
mortgage interest deduction for second homes because the initial report from President
Reagan’s Treasury Department suggested that Congress act to curb tax incentives for
large personal consumption expenditures, explicitly naming second homes as a target.
See Robinson v. Comm’r, 119 T.C. 44, 53 (2002) (quoting DEP’T OF TREASURY, TAX REFORM
FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT
TO THE PRESIDENT 83 (1984)).
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“tax policy accident,”42 Congress justified retaining the deduction as a
method of protecting the middle class and encouraging homeownership.43
C. Intended Benefits: Achieving the American Dream
Homeownership tends to improve people’s lives both economically
and socially,44 although some commentators dispute the extent of those
benefits.45 Economically, home equity can provide a critical source of
income stability when a taxpayer’s income falls.46 Compared to renters,
homeowners also have higher levels of accumulated wealth because

42. Mann, supra note 7, at 1352; see also HARDAWAY, supra note 15, at 131
(describing the origins of the mortgage interest deduction as “an historical accident now
lost to the collective memory”); JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, TAX REFORM, THE RICH AND THE
POOR 86 (2d ed. 1989) (“Since the tax advantages of homeowners are regarded by
politicians as untouchable, the act kept intact . . . the deduction for interest on home
mortgages . . . .”).
43. See, e.g., 132 CONG. REC. 14,916 (1986) (statement of Sen. Cohen); 132 CONG.
REC. 14,524 (1986) (statement of Sen. Chafee) (“There is the feeling that the viability of
the home mortgage interest deduction is so ensconced in our code and the American
ethic, and I believe rightfully so. I think it is a major factor for people to own their own
homes, which I believe is good for the country.”); see also Fid. Int’l Currency Advisor A
Fund, LLC v. United States, 747 F. Supp. 2d 49, 69 (D. Mass. 2010) (explaining that the
mortgage interest deduction is one of many tax incentives encouraging homeownership
instead of renting). At this point, it is important to note that although the mortgage
interest deduction is the only type of personal debt deductible from income and is the
largest single tax subsidy for housing, it is only one of many tax incentives for
homeownership. See Tim Krumwiede & Kathy Simons, Tax Benefits of Home
Ownership, TAXES, July 2003, at 37. Closely related to the interest deduction because it
provides a subsidy for just owning a home is the itemized deduction for state and local
personal property taxes. I.R.C. § 164(a)(2) (2006). Other benefits include an exclusion
for a portion of gain upon selling a principal residence, id. § 121, and a deduction for the
use of a portion of the home or a separate structure on the property for business
purposes, id. § 280A(c)(1).
44. See Barbara A. Wiens-Tuers, There’s No Place Like Home: The Relationship
of Nonstandard Employment and Home Ownership Over the 1990s, 63 AM. J. ECON. &
SOC. 881, 883–85 (2004) (collecting studies showing homeowners’ enhanced financial
stability and participation in community organizations).
45. See Stephanie M. Stern, Reassessing the Citizen Virtues of Homeownership,
111 COLUM. L. REV. 890, 903–04 (2011) (explaining that the positive impact of
homeownership on participation in civic organizations and local affairs is relatively
modest when compared to similarly situated renters).
46. Wiens-Tuers, supra note 44, at 883. However, the converse of this is true as
well; homeowners undergo a deep sense of financial instability when their largest
financial asset is worth less than what they owe. See MARK ZANDI, FINANCIAL SHOCK:
A 360° LOOK AT THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE IMPLOSION, AND HOW TO AVOID THE NEXT
FINANCIAL CRISIS 217 (2009).
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homes provide a major share of their assets.47 Because homeowners can
use equity in their homes—rather than direct support from government
programs—to weather tough times, retire securely, or achieve other social
welfare objectives, some characterize homeownership itself as a form of
“private social insurance.”48 Accordingly, government subsidies for private
homeownership may replace some of the direct spending necessary to
achieve similar social welfare outcomes.49
Beyond economic advantages, homeownership also provides a number of
“spillover” social benefits,50 such as increased political activity, greater
awareness of environmental issues, and better health outcomes.51 These
secondary benefits also extend to the children of homeowners, who
experience higher cognitive achievement in math and reading,52 as well
as higher graduation rates.53 These cognitive and educational outcomes
correlate with fewer behavioral problems and incidents of deviant
behavior.54 Just as government support for homeownership may replace

47. Wiens-Tuers, supra note 44, at 883. Primary residences represent more than
half of homeowners’ overall financial assets. Id. In 2006, American homeowners
owned $20 trillion in residential property, more than double the total amount of ownerheld property ten years earlier. ZANDI, supra note 46, at 49.
48. Dalton Conley & Brian Gifford, Home Ownership, Social Insurance, and the
Welfare State, 21 SOC. F. 55, 62, 75 (2006). From this perspective, the mortgage interest
deduction represents what Jacob S. Hacker terms the “[s]ubsidies and inducements”
approach to social insurance. JACOB S. HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE: THE
BATTLE OVER PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SOCIAL BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES 30 tbl.1.1
(2002). Hacker places approaches to social welfare on a spectrum ranging from direct
provision to pure market allocation and identifies tax breaks as a chief means for
government to encourage private behavior that enhances social welfare. See id.
49. See Conley & Gifford, supra note 48, at 75. The logical end to this argument—if
the mortgage interest deduction actually increases homeownership—is that ending the
deduction might require increased direct social welfare spending in the future, mitigating
at least a very minor portion of the fiscal impact of repealing the provision. See id. As
discussed in Part III, however, the mortgage interest deduction actually fails to increase
homeownership and contributes to the type of housing market instability and poor
financial decisionmaking that put Americans at greater risk of financial ruin.
50. Wiens-Tuers, supra note 44, at 883–85.
51. See Robert D. Dietz & Donald R. Haurin, The Social and Private Micro-level
Consequences of Homeownership, 54 J. URB. ECON. 401, 404, 434, 439 (2003) (collecting
studies). Studies consistently suggest homeowners are more likely to vote than their renting
counterparts. Id. at 430. On health, homeowners may take better care of the conditions of
their homes, abating harmful building materials and preventing the growth of unhealthy
conditions. See id. at 433.
52. Donald R. Haurin et al., The Impact of Homeownership on Child Outcomes 15
(Havard Univ. Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies Low-Income Homeownership Working Paper
Series, Paper No. LIHO-01.14, 2001), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/
jchs.harvard.edu/files/liho01-14.pdf.
53. Dietz & Haurin, supra note 51, at 432. Families that own homes are less likely
to move, reducing educational instability and boosting children’s chances of completing
a secondary education. Id.
54. Haurin et al., supra note 52, at 15.
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a portion of direct social spending,55 targeted homeownership incentives
may be a worthwhile alternative to direct spending on education.56
Beyond its tangible advantages, owning real property is also intimately
connected to foundational social and political values held since the founding
of the Republic, namely, economic autonomy and political freedom.57
Homeownership remains a central component of the modern American
conception of autonomy and social mobility, otherwise known as the
“American Dream.”58 Indeed, owning a home is both a stand-alone aspect
of the American Dream and fully integrated with that ideal’s other facets—
educational opportunity, social mobility, financial security, and a secure
retirement59—because the spillover benefits of homeownership provide
meaningful support to families seeking those other social goods.60
In spite of its popularity and the natural political protection afforded to
the deduction by its association with the American Dream, the mortgage
interest deduction and homeownership have serious social and economic
implications that Congress cannot ignore.61

55. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
56. Haurin et al., supra note 52, at 16. Donald Haurin, Toby Parcel, and Jean
Haurin suggest that policymakers seeking to improve educational attainment should
consider targeted homeownership programs as an alternative to direct government
spending on education. Id. Again, the mortgage interest deduction does not provide the
type of targeted homeownership benefit capable of increasing homeownership for renters
on the cusp of being able to buy a home. See infra Part III.B. A shared equity program
would provide a more targeted, less expensive alternative for renters on the cusp of
affording a home. See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
57. See Geoffrey D. Korff, Reviving the Forgotten American Dream, 113 PENN.
ST. L. REV. 417, 422 (2008) (“Many of the framers . . . despite the federalist and antifederalist differences among them, expounded on the interdependent, and often reinforcing,
relationships among property ownership, economic autonomy, and political freedom.”).
Korff argues, however, that the actual connection between property ownership, economic
autonomy, and political freedom valued by the founding generation is significantly
weaker or nonexistent today because property largely serves residential rather than
economically productive purposes, as it did during the eighteenth century. Id. at 425–27.
58. E.g., Kristen David Adams, Can Promise Enforcement Save Affordable
Housing in the United States?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 643, 659 (2004); Korff, supra note
57, at 428.
59. See Korff, supra note 57, at 428.
60. See Dietz & Haurin, supra note 51, at 432–33, 439; Wiens-Tuers, supra note
44, at 883–85.
61. See infra Part III.C.
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III. MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION DOWNSIDES AND
REPLACEMENT POLICIES
Although homeownership may provide some societal benefits, the
home mortgage interest deduction is an ineffective and ultimately harmful
approach to increasing homeownership.62 The deduction fails to increase
homeownership rates, is the second most expensive “tax expenditure” in
the Code, and incentivizes flawed housing and investment choices that
drive up home prices and encourage suburban sprawl.63 For those
reasons, fiscal and tax reform commissions appointed by both President
George W. Bush and President Barack Obama have found that the
mortgage interest deduction is a provision in need of reform.64
A. Costs
For fiscal years 2010 through 2014, the Joint Committee on Taxation
(JCT) estimates the home mortgage interest tax deduction will result in
$484.1 billion of reduced revenue to the U.S. Treasury, making it the
second costliest deduction in the tax code.65 That amount represents
approximately 8.6% of federal tax expenditures for that period.66 For
fiscal year 2011, the cost of the mortgage interest deduction represented
approximately 7.2% of the of the year’s budget deficit of $1.3 trillion.67
Alone, those percentages may seem small, but when characterized as a
subsidy for homeownership, the mortgage interest deduction represents
more than twice the amount of direct spending on federal housing
programs.68 Facing grave short- and long-term fiscal questions,69 and in
62. See infra Part III.B–C.
63. See infra Part III.C.
64. NAT’L COMM’N ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REFORM, THE MOMENT OF TRUTH
28–31 (2010) (President Obama), available at http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/
sites/fiscalcommission.gov/files/documents/TheMomentofTruth12_1_2010.pdf; PRESIDENT’S
ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, supra note 32, at 72 (President Bush).
65. H.R. REP. NO. 112-58, at 50 tbl.10 (2011). The single largest subsidy in the
Code is the exclusion of employer-paid health insurance premiums, long-term care
insurance premiums, and health care contributions, which the JCT estimates will cost
$659.4 billion from 2010 to 2014. Id. at 54 tbl.10.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 50 tbl.10; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 4474, THE BUDGET AND
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2012 TO 2022, at 2 tbl.1-1 (2012), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/01-31-2012_Outlook.pdf.
68. See CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE: TAX EXPENDITURES
AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 28 (1997). When added to other tax benefits
for housing, total tax-side housing subsidies eclipse the program budget of the entire
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL
ON FED. TAX REFORM, supra note 32, at 72.
69. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF REDUCING THE FISCAL RESTRAINT
THAT IS SCHEDULED TO OCCUR IN 2013 1 (2012), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/
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a time of bipartisan agreement on the need to undertake 1986-style tax
simplification, such large tax expenditures merit attention as targets for
reform.70
B. An Ineffective Homeownership Policy
The primary justification for the mortgage interest deduction is
encouraging homeownership, but comparative evidence suggests that the
deduction has little to no effect on the U.S. homeownership rate.71 In
2005, 69% of Americans owned their homes.72 Other developed countries
without mortgage interest deductions had comparable rates, including
the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia.73 Those comparably high
ownership rates suggest that mortgage interest subsidies are not necessary to
achieve broad homeownership.74
One reason the mortgage interest deduction has little impact on the
homeownership rate is that lower income households, whether they own
a home or not, are unlikely to itemize their taxes.75 Thus, for renters on
the cusp of being able to afford to buy a home, the deduction fails to
provide the marginal benefit necessary to move them from renting to
owning.76 Beyond the itemization barrier, those on the margin of buying
default/files/cbofiles/attachments/FiscalRestraint_0.pdf. For example, at the end of
2012, Congress faced a “fiscal cliff,” a confluence of scheduled tax increases and
automatic spending cuts. Id. Although inaction would have reduced the deficit, the
suddenness of the tax increases and spending cuts would have harmed the economy, id.,
and many businesses were nervous Congress would not act. Nelson D. Schwartz,
Partisan Impasse Drives Industry To Cut Spending, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2012, at A1.
70. See NAT’L COMM’N ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REFORM, supra note 64, at
28–31.
71. See PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, supra note 32, at 72.
72. Id.
73. Id. In 2005, Canada’s homeownership rate was 66%, Australia’s was 70%,
and the United Kingdom’s was 69%. Id. Canada provides an instructive foil on how
privileges for housing investment fail to raise homeownership: although the United
States has more capital invested in residential property than Canada, the two countries
have comparable homeownership rates. See James M. Poterba, Taxation and Housing
Markets, in CANADA-U.S. TAX COMPARISONS 275, 276 (John B. Shoven & John Whalley
eds., 1992).
74. PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, supra note 32, at 72.
75. Glaeser & Shapiro, supra note 6, at 81.
76. See id. at 76–77. If those renters did purchase homes, they would likely be
part of the 28% of homeowners who do not benefit from the mortgage interest deduction
due to the itemization barrier. See Sahadi, supra note 1. In contrast, the “full benefits”
of the deduction are more readily counted on by households likely to itemize their
deductions—those with higher incomes. ZANDI, supra note 46, at 51.
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homes are further disadvantaged because the deduction increases the
cost of housing, pricing some buyers out of the housing market.77 Given
its inability to actually increase homeownership, the mortgage interest
deduction “is really not a pro-homeownership policy in any meaningful
sense.”78
C. A Regressive Provision with Harmful Side Effects
Although the rate structure of the U.S. tax system is moderately
progressive,79 the mortgage interest deduction favors higher income earners
in a way that reduces progressivity.80 For example, in 2008, 72% of
households with mortgages claimed the mortgage interest deduction.81
And although taxpayers earning over $200,000 made up only 11% of the
households claiming the deduction, those taxpayers’ subsidies amounted
to 32% of the total cost of the mortgage interest deduction.82 The
disproportionate cost of providing the deduction to higher income
taxpayers results in part from the larger value of deductions to those
taxpayers.83
The average deduction value demonstrates the discrepancy in the
deduction’s benefit to higher income and middle class earners.84 In
2004, for households with incomes of over $200,000, the average
deduction was greater than $5,000.85 Meanwhile, the average home
mortgage deduction for taxpayers in all income brackets, including in
the former group, was $591.86 The discrepancy in the value of the
deduction based on income is more dramatically demonstrated by the
$33,246 average deduction taken by households earning $1 million or
more in 2006.87

77.
78.
79.

See infra notes 96–99 and accompanying text.
Glaeser & Shapiro, supra note 6, at 81.
JOSEPH M. DODGE, THE LOGIC OF TAX: FEDERAL INCOME TAX THEORY AND
POLICY 2 (1989).
80. PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, supra note 32, at 72. See
generally Lepore, supra note 29, at 107–08 (discussing regressive tax expenditures).
81. See Sahadi, supra note 1.
82. Id. Seventy-five percent of the forgone funds went to households earning over
$100,000. Id.
83. As in the example of Alice and Ben, Alice received a tax break of twenty-eight
cents on every dollar spent on mortgage interest, whereas Ben’s tax break was only
fifteen cents of every dollar spent on interest. See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying
text.
84. See PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, supra note 32, at 72
fig.5.6.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. TOM A. COBURN, SUBSIDIES OF THE RICH AND FAMOUS 24 (2011), available at
http://www.coburn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=544ae3e7-195b-
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Because of the itemization barrier and the fact that more income
means higher benefits, the mortgage interest deduction is an “upside-down
subsidy”—taxpayers with historically high homeownership rates are the
ones that receive the largest subsidies.88 As Professor Roberta Mann
points out, Congress would never adopt a direct-payment housing subsidy
providing $5,000 to those making over $200,000 while most American
homeowners receive less than $600.89
These tremendous subsidies encourage many homeowners to purchase
larger, more costly homes than they would otherwise.90 Consider this
example of how the deduction encourages the purchase of more expensive
homes: Damon, who makes $100,000 per year, has $30,000 for a down
payment, and pays a 28% tax rate, considers buying one of two homes.
House A is valued at $300,000, and House B is valued at $350,000.
With a fixed interest rate of 4%, if Damon buys House A, he will receive
a benefit of $54,300 from the mortgage interest deduction over the life
of the loan.91 However, if Damon buys House B, his benefit over the life
of the loan would be approximately $64,400.92 After accounting for the
40ad-aa84-334fdd6a5e1f. As striking as that subsidy level may seem, the most symbolic
excess of the deduction is that it does not just subsidize brick and mortar homes, but
yachts used as residences as well. See Press Release, Senator John D. Rockefeller,
Rockefeller Offers Proposals To Trim $1.29 Trillion from Deficit (June 30, 2011),
available at LEXIS, 2011 TNT 129-34 (proposing to do away with the subsidy for
yachts).
88. Mann, supra note 7, at 1361. Households with income at or above the median
family income have a homeownership rate of 81.5%, whereas those below the median
income have a homeownership rate of 51.4%. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau,
Residential Vacancies and Homeownership in the First Quarter 2011, at 9 tbl.8 (Apr. 27,
2011), http://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/files/qtr111/q111press.pdf.
89. See Mann, supra note 7, at 1362. For the numbers provided, see PRESIDENT’S
ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, supra note 32, at 72 fig.5.6.
90. Mark Andrew Snider, The Suburban Advantage: Are the Tax Benefits of
Homeownership Defensible?, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 157, 170–71 (2005).
91. Mortgage Payment Calculator Results for a $270,000, Thirty-Year, Fixed-Rate
Loan at 4% Interest, BANKRATE.COM, http://www.bankrate.com/calculators/mortgages/
mortgage-calculator.aspx (input “270,000” as “Mortgage Amount”; then input “30” as
“Mortgage Term”; then input “4” as “Interest Rate”; then click “Show/Recalculate
Amortization Table”). The total interest for a $270,000 loan on House A is $194,047.67.
Id. If Damon’s tax rate stays at a constant 28% for the life of the loan, the value of the
mortgage interest deduction over that time is $54,333.35. See id. ($194,047.67 total
interest x 0.28 tax value of deduction = $54,333.35).
92. Mortgage Payment Calculator Results for a $320,000, Thirty-Year, Fixed-Rate
Loan at 4% Interest, BANKRATE.COM, http://www.bankrate.com/calculators/mortgages
/mortgage-calculator.aspx (input “320,000” as “Mortgage Amount”; then input “30” as
“Mortgage Term”; then input “4” as “Interest Rate”; then click “Show/Recalculate
Amortization Table”). The total interest for a $320,000 loan on House B is $229,982.42.
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differences in principal and accrued interest, the mortgage interest deduction
reduces the cost differential between Houses A and B by approximately
$10,000 over the life of the loan.93 In other words, Damon can buy the
more expensive of the two homes, and the federal government will
subsidize him for a portion of the additional cost. By encouraging
prospective buyers like Damon to buy larger homes than they might
otherwise, the mortgage interest deduction promotes suburban sprawl and
the negative externalities associated with it—decreases in open space,
increases in auto-related greenhouse gas emissions, and diminished
vitality in urban cores.94 In short, the mortgage interest deduction allows
those who would likely buy homes anyhow to purchase larger, more
expensive homes.95
Subsidizing homeownership through the mortgage interest deduction
also drives housing inflation, pricing many buyers out of the market.96
The inflationary impact of the deduction is most acute in regions where
housing stock is limited, increasing prices by as much as 10%.97 Because
the mortgage interest deduction contributes to higher housing prices, it
actually reduces homeownership in inelastic housing markets.98 For
middle and upper income households in such markets, the deduction
decreases ownership by 3.7% and 3.4%, respectively.99
Further, by subsidizing homeownership, the mortgage interest
deduction encourages economically inefficient behavior by providing
tax preferences for housing investment.100 Because of housing subsidies,

Id. Given a constant 28% tax rate, the value of the mortgage interest deduction over that
time is $64,395.08. See id. ($229,982.42 total interest x 0.28 tax value of deduction =
$64,395.08).
93. House A: $270,000 principal + $194,047.67 interest = $464,047.67 total loan
cost. House B: $320,000 principal + $229,982.42 interest = $549,982.42 total loan cost.
Thus, before taking the mortgage interest deduction into account, the total cost differential
between the two homes is $85,934.75. When the respective mortgage interest deductions are
subtracted from the total costs, the total cost differential is reduced by $10,061.73 to
$75,873.02.
94. See Mann, supra note 7, at 1375, 1380, 1384.
95. See Stern, supra note 45, at 931 n.193 (citing Glaeser & Shapiro, supra note 6,
at 40).
96. See HARDAWAY, supra note 15, at 133.
97. Dorothy A. Brown, Shades of the American Dream, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 329,
337 (2009).
98. See Hilber & Turner, supra note 8, at 22.
99. Id.
100. See THE PRESIDENT’S ECON. RECOVERY ADVISORY BD., THE REPORT ON TAX
REFORM OPTIONS: SIMPLIFICATION, COMPLIANCE, AND CORPORATE TAXATION 46 (2010).
A number of tax deductions, including the mortgage interest deduction, encourage
taxpayers to make investment decisions that without tax subsidies they would not
otherwise make. See id. Thus, subsidized investments displace more productive economic
activities. See id.; see also SALANIÉ, supra note 2, at 49 (“[T]axation is unlikely to have
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the effective marginal tax rate on owner-occupied housing is zero.101 In
contrast, business sector investment has an effective tax rate of 22%.102
This disparity encourages investors to move capital toward residential
assets rather than more productive capital goods.103 A JCT study modeling
individual tax reform both with and without housing subsidies suggests
that housing does indeed displace other investment104 and that long-run
gross domestic product (GDP) would be higher without housing
deductions.105
D. Is Homeownership Worth Subsidizing?
Setting aside the negative consequences of the mortgage interest
deduction, should the federal government subsidize homeownership at
all? Although owning a home may provide wealth and financial stability
in the long run,106 a home is also an “anchor”107 that does not provide
income and requires significant transaction costs for purchase and sale.108
These transaction costs, along with neighborhood ties, restrain homeowners

a large impact on total savings, although it clearly plays an important role in determining
where the money is invested.”).
101. PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, supra note 32, at 71 fig.5.5.
102. Id.
103. Hearing, supra note 31 (statement of Dr. Richard K. Green); accord
PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, supra note 32, at 71 & fig.5.5
(“[T]he economy-wide tax rate on housing investment is close to zero, compared with a
tax rate of approximately 22 percent on business investment. . . . Too little [business]
investment means lower worker productivity, and ultimately, lower real wages and living
standards. While the housing industry does produce jobs and may have other positive
effects on the overall economy, it is not clear that it should enjoy such disproportionately
favorable treatment under the tax code.”).
104. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF A PROPOSAL
TO BROADEN THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX BASE AND LOWER INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
RATES 11 tbl.4 (2006), available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=select&
id=20. JCT estimated that a tax code model without housing deductions would result in a
2.5% long-run increase in real producers’ capital stock compared to current law. Id. In
contrast, a model retaining housing deductions would decrease real producers’ capital
stock by 0.8%. Id.
105. See id. at 10 tbl.2. The JCT-modeled tax reform that eliminated housing
deductions would result in 0.9% greater growth in GDP compared to current law, while a
model retaining the deductions would result in only 0.5% greater growth. Id.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 46–47.
107. Korff, supra note 57, at 440.
108. Mathias, supra note 19, at 55.
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from seeking work opportunities beyond their immediate geographic
area.109
This anchoring also harms the broader economy. To stay in their
homes, workers will remain in jobs for which they are poorly suited,
hindering economic efficiency on the national level.110 For that and
other reasons, some academics argue that too much homeownership can
actually harm rather than help a nation’s economy and that government
homeownership subsidies are a misguided policy altogether.111 Even if
Congress did decide to reduce homeownership subsidies, such a policy
change would not necessitate a drop in homeownership, as the experience
of other countries suggests.112
E. Three Options for the Treatment of Mortgage Interest in
Comprehensive Tax Reform
For the reasons above, this Comment proceeds on the premise that
Congress should use comprehensive tax reform to end the mortgage
interest deduction as we know it.113 To do this, Congress has three general
options: (1) eliminate the deduction,114 (2) replace the deduction with a
tax credit,115 or (3) modify the workings of the deduction.116

109. Glaeser & Shapiro, supra note 6, at 71–72.
110. See Mathias, supra note 19, at 55; The Road Not Taken, ECONOMIST (Mar. 19,
2009), http://www.economist.com/node/13331109.
111. See The Road Not Taken, supra note 110 (“A decade ago Andrew Oswald of
the University of Warwick in Britain argued that excessive home-ownership kills jobs.
He observed that, in Europe, nations with high rates of home-ownership, such as Spain,
had much higher unemployment rates than those where more people rented, such as
Switzerland. He found this effect was stronger than tax rates or employment law.”).
112. See supra text accompanying notes 71–74.
113. The Author assumes that Congress will likely retain some form of an income
tax in a comprehensive tax reform package, although there are a number of other
approaches, specifically consumption taxes, that academics argue are superior to the
progressive income tax. For a discussion of various consumption tax proposals, see
generally Alan Schenk, The Plethora of Consumption Tax Proposals: Putting the Value
Added Tax, Flat Tax, Retail Sales Tax, and USA Tax into Perspective, 33 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1281 (1996). However, even if Congress were to adopt some form of a
consumption tax, the primary argument of this Comment would still apply and counsel
strongly against any carve-out for mortgage interest other than necessary transition relief.
See Daniel S. Goldberg, The Aches and Pains of Transition to a Consumption Tax: Can
We Get There from Here?, 26 VA. TAX REV. 447, 482 (2007) (discussing the fact that all
forms of a consumption tax would by definition tax home purchases unless Congress
retained a special subsidy for them).
114. See infra Part IV.A.
115. See infra Part IV.B.
116. See infra Part IV.C.
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First, Congress could eliminate the deduction and treat all forms of
interest on personal debt the same.117 This would complete the move
toward neutral treatment of personal debt that started with the Tax
Reform Act of 1986.118 Second, Congress could convert the mortgage
interest deduction to a tax credit.119 Two presidential commissions and a
number of think tanks have endorsed such an approach120 because credits
are not subject to the itemization barrier121 and reduce tax liability
dollar-for-dollar.122 Transforming the deduction into a credit would also
provide a considerable source with which to offset tax rate cuts or reduce
the deficit, though far less than elimination.123 Third, Congress could
retain the deduction but make modifications like lowering the $1.1 million
cap, ending deductibility of home equity interest,124 or removing the
subsidy for second homes and yachts.125 Some changes, like disallowing
the deduction for yachts or second homes, would have a minor budgetary
impact but address the more notorious excesses of the current deduction.126

117. Contra I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(D) (2006) (exempting mortgage debt from
characterization as nondeductible personal interest).
118. See HARDAWAY, supra note 15, at 132; Mann, supra note 7, at 1352. Eliminating
the mortgage interest deduction would achieve what the Reagan Treasury Department
originally set out to attain with I.R.C. § 163(h): an end to unnecessary tax subsidies for
exceptional consumer expenditures. See Robinson v. Comm’r, 119 T.C. 44, 53 (2002)
(quoting DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 41, at 83).
119. See Report Finds Agreement Among Organizations on Tax Reform, TAX
NOTES TODAY, May 26, 2011, available at LEXIS, 2011 TNT 102-37.
120. See id. (identifying the Bipartisan Policy Center, Economic Policy Institute,
and Roosevelt Campus Network as supporters of converting the deduction into a credit).
121. ERIC TODER ET AL., URBAN INST., TAX POLICY CTR. & WHAT WORKS
COLLABORATIVE, REFORMING THE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION 2 (2010), available
at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412099-mortgage-deduction-reform.pdf.
122. JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 971
(16th ed. 2011). As a simple example, assume Ellen earns $1,000 per year, is taxed at a
rate of 20%, and can choose either a $100 tax deduction or $100 tax credit. The
deduction would decrease Ellen’s taxable income to $900, which taxed at 20% results in
a $180 final tax liability. With the credit, Ellen’s taxable income is $1,000, which, taxed
at 20%, results in computed tax liability of $200. But the credit then reduces computed
liability by a full $100, for a $100 final tax liability.
123. See infra text accompanying notes 252–54.
124. See, e.g., Coburn Budget Plan Would Scale Back Mortgage Interest
Deduction, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 19, 2011, available at LEXIS, 2011 TNT 138-3.
125. See Rockefeller, supra note 87. A similar piece of legislation disallowing
boats as qualified residences failed to pass in 1988. See WILLIAM D. POPKIN, FUNDAMENTALS
OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAW 264 (1994); see also S. 624, 100th Cong. (1987).
126. See Coburn Budget Plan Would Scale Back Mortgage Interest Deduction,
supra note 124; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, BUDGET OPTIONS 394 (2001), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/27xx/doc2731/entire-report.pdf
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Proponents of each of these three approaches argue that the policy
they advocate will ameliorate one or more of the negative aspects of the
deduction under current law.127 Many commentators, however, fail to
fully account for the short-term impact of adopting their preferred policy,
such as how it will affect property values.128 But the short-term effects
of a policy change should not be ignored; Congress might forgo an
overhaul of the mortgage interest deduction if there is no apparent suitable
way to reform the deduction without harming the housing market or
homeowners.129
For that reason, Congress should simultaneously evaluate ideal longterm policies and explore options for minimizing the impact on property
values.130 In previous tax reform efforts, Congress has adopted transition
relief policies designed to ameliorate some of the hardship caused by the
new laws.131 In order to understand which policies to adopt, however,
the objectives and potential impact of changing the mortgage interest
deduction must be clear.
F. Implications of Changing the Mortgage Interest Deduction
1. Long-Term Considerations
In deciding how to treat mortgage debt under the tax code, Congress
should look to basic tax reform principles as its primary criteria. The
objectives of a comprehensive tax overhaul include promoting economic
(indicating that disallowing mortgage interest deductions for second homes would have
added $7.8 billion in revenue from 2002 to 2011).
127. See, e.g., Ventry, supra note 33, at 283 (stating that replacing the mortgage
interest deduction with a tax credit would “tie the subsidy to need rather than marginal
tax rates, reduce complexity in taxpaying and tax administration by reducing itemizers,”
and “if permitted by budgetary realities, allow for rate reduction”).
128. See, e.g., id. at 277–84. But see Mathias, supra note 19, at 70–72 (discussing
the need for and options for transition relief in eliminating the mortgage interest
deduction). That is not to say, however, that long-term considerations are not important.
Indeed, two of the most salient reasons for eliminating the deduction, reducing housing
inflation and preventing future housing bubbles, are important long-term considerations.
See HARDAWAY, supra note 15, at 131; Hilber & Turner, supra note 8, at 22.
129. See Donald Bruce & Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Will a Consumption Tax Kill the
Housing Market?, in TRANSITION COSTS OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 96, 97 (Kevin
A. Hassett & R. Glenn Hubbard eds., 2001) (“The durability of the preferential tax
treatment of owner-occupied housing reflects the widespread fear that reform (seemingly
any reform) would harm the property values of homeowners.”).
130. See SHILLER, supra note 15, at 84 (“The idea that public policy should be
aimed at validating the real estate myth, preventing a collapse in home prices from ever
happening, is an error of the first magnitude. In the short run a sudden drop in home
prices may indeed disrupt the economy, producing undesirable systemic effects. But, in
the long run, the home-price drops are clearly a good thing.”).
131. Kyle D. Logue, Tax Transitions, Opportunistic Retroactivity, and the Benefits
of Government Precommitment, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1134 (1996).
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efficiency and growth, decreasing interference with private economic
decisionmaking, easing the burdens of tax compliance,132 and treating
similarly situated taxpayers equally.133
As a second criteria, Congress must also address those aspects of our
tax system that contributed to the burst of the 2000s housing bubble and
the Great Recession.134 Congress has already taken steps to address some
mortgage excesses,135 and in 2011 the Obama Administration proposed
winding down mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.136 The
federal government should not repeat the mistakes of the previous housing
bubble by failing to change laws that stimulate unsafe overinvestment in
housing.137 Accordingly, the mortgage interest deduction should be one
aspect of broader housing policy reform.138
2. Short-Term Considerations
Whatever long-term tax policy Congress chooses, lawmakers must
also account for the impact such a policy would have short term. A serious
argument against changing the mortgage interest deduction is that doing

132. See GRAETZ, supra note 3, at 52.
133. See PECHMAN, supra note 42, at 44 (“[Deductions are] deviations from equal
treatment [that] tend to be arbitrary.”).
134. Professor Robert M. Hardaway identifies the mortgage interest deduction as
the primary culprit in the tax code responsible for the housing bubble. See HARDAWAY,
supra note 15, at 131.
135. See Dwight M. Jaffee, Bank Regulation and Mortgage Market Reform,
8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 8, 16–17 (2011) (summarizing the mortgage-related provisions of
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010).
136. See U.S. D EP ’T OF T REASURY & U.S. D EP ’T OF H OUS . & URBAN DEV.,
REFORMING AMERICA’S HOUSING FINANCE MARKET: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 2 (2011),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/documents/reforming%20america%27s
%20housing%20finance%20market.pdf. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are governmentsponsored enterprises that ease housing finance by buying mortgages from other
institutions or guaranteeing mortgage loans. Michael S. Barr, The Financial Crisis and
the Path of Reform, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 111 (2012). In 2008, when the housing
market collapsed and losses from mortgage defaults mounted, the federal government
had to bail out Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. See Paul M. Jonna, Comment, In Search of
Market Discipline: The Case for Indirect Hedge Fund Regulation, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
989, 1006 n.92 (2008).
137. See SHILLER, supra note 15, at 3–4 (discussing the American failure to identify
and respond to speculative bubbles).
138. See HARDAWAY, supra note 15, at 172 (recommending policies to address
conditions that led to the housing bubble).
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so will decrease property values during an already-weak housing market.139
Further, the centrality of housing to the overall economy makes changes
in housing-related tax policy a major point of concern for policymakers.140
Accordingly, the state of the housing market should be an important but
not overstated consideration in determining how to alter the mortgage
interest deduction.141
Currently, the U.S. housing market is still recovering from the burst of
the housing bubble in 2007, which caused a severe and sustained drop in
home prices.142 The housing sector is, however, finally starting to turn
around,143 and forecasters expect home prices to grow by approximately
3.8% from the third quarter of 2012 to the third quarter of 2013.144
Although the bottom of the housing market may be behind us,
symptoms of housing market fragility remain.145 During the first quarter
of 2012, 31.4% of homes with mortgages were underwater.146 These
homeowners owed more on their mortgages than their homes were worth,147
a circumstance that increases the chance of default.148 In short, foreclosures
remain at elevated levels149 and the slow turnaround in the housing market
continues to pose a challenge to the economic recovery.150
Housing market health is key to economic growth and stability because
of its outsized and interconnected role in the U.S. economy.151 Housing
market weakness heavily affects residential construction, state and local

139. See Hearing, supra note 31 (statement of Dr. Karl Case, Professor of
Economics Emeritus, Wellesley College, and Senior Fellow, Joint Center for Housing
Studies, Harvard University).
140. See ZANDI, supra note 46, at 215.
141. See Hearing, supra note 31 (statement of Dr. Karl Case).
142. See In re Smith, 435 B.R. 637, 643 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2010) (describing the
housing market collapse); U.S. HOME SALE PRICES, supra note 23, at 11–12.
143. E.g., David Wessel, Housing Passes a Milestone, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2012,
at A2; Nick Timiraos, Home Prices Climb as Supplies Dwindle, WALL ST. J., August 8,
2012, at A1.
144. Fiserv, Inc., supra note 13.
145. E.g., Nick Timiraos, Mortgage Delinquencies Rose in Second Quarter, WALL
ST. J. (Aug. 9, 2012, 11:08 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000087239639044340
4004577579050532818834.html.
146. Les Christie, More than 30% of Mortgage Borrowers Still Underwater, CNN
MONEY (May 24, 2012, 5:23 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/05/24/real_estate/under
water-mortgages/index.htm.
147. Id.
148. William G. Gale, Commentary, in TRANSITION COSTS OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX
REFORM, supra note 129, at 115, 119.
149. See supra note 13.
150. FED. OPEN MKT. COMM., JUNE 19–20, 2012 MINUTES 7 (2012), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20120620.pdf.
151. See Hearing, supra note 31 (statement of Dr. Karl Case).
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government funding, and consumer spending.152 For example, during
the housing boom, the residential construction industry boosted real
GDP by approximately 0.5%.153 Accordingly, when the housing market
faltered, the homebuilding decline led to decreased demand for building
materials and less construction on related projects, such as infrastructure
and schools.154
IV. OPTIONS FOR REFORMING THE DEDUCTION IN A
FRAGILE HOUSING MARKET
In light of the weaknesses of the mortgage interest deduction discussed in
Part III, Congress should adopt a new tax policy toward mortgage debt.
But because the housing market remains fragile, tax policy changes
affecting the housing market must provide suitable transition relief to
ensure that the housing market recovery is not unduly disrupted. As
discussed below, completely eliminating the mortgage interest deduction
best accomplishes the principles animating tax reform and more
sustainable long-term housing market growth. Should Congress decide
to continue subsidizing mortgage interest through the tax code, however,
it should convert the deduction to a credit or substantially modify the
deduction, in that order of preference. Congress can minimize any
housing market disruption these policies might cause by concurrently
adopting transition policies to protect property values and homeowners.155
A. Option 1: Eliminate the Deduction
1. Long-Term Advantages and Disadvantages
As the discussion in Part III reveals, the mortgage interest deduction is
a costly, regressive tax provision that fails to achieve its primary
objective. 156 Rather than increasing homeownership, the deduction
stimulates overinvestment in real estate and inflates home prices, which
152. ZANDI, supra note 46, at 216–17. Because many consumers make expenditures
in part using the equity in their homes, falling home prices constrain overall consumer
spending. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 2834, HOUSING WEALTH AND
CONSUMER SPENDING 6 tbl.1, 12 tbl.2 (2007), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/
default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/77xx/doc7719/01-05-housing.pdf.
153. ZANDI, supra note 46, at 216.
154. Id.
155. See infra Parts IV.A.3, B.3, C.3.
156. See supra Part III.
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undermine economic growth and affordability for future generations.157
For those reasons, many commentators support complete elimination of
the mortgage interest deduction.158
Unlike a modification of the deduction or conversion to a tax credit,
complete elimination broadens the tax base most significantly.159 This
broader tax base conforms with comprehensive tax reform priorities,160
as well as the principles of neutrality and efficiency.161 By eliminating
the deduction and moving the tax system closer to neutrality, this approach
would represent an important step in ending federal government policies
that contributed to the housing bubble.162 When mortgage interest is
nondeductible, taxpayers prioritize paying down their mortgages more
quickly.163 One example of that effect is in Australia, which has no
deduction for mortgage interest.164 Although the amount of mortgage debt
Australian homeowners take on is similar to their American counterparts,
homeowners in that country paid down mortgage debt more quickly than
in the United States.165
These types of household shifts in spending priorities to pay down
mortgages have important benefits for homeowners and the economy.166
First, homeowners who pay off their mortgages more quickly feel more
financially secure and are typically in better financial shape because they
have less outstanding debt.167 Second, although a shift to paying down
157. See supra notes 96–105 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., Mann, supra note 7, at 1393; Mathias, supra note 19, at 45.
159. Alex M. Brill & Alan D. Viard, AEI Says Tax Base Broadening Should Target
Biggest Distortions, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 28, 2011, available at LEXIS, 2011 TNT
188-39.
160. Id.
161. Professor Joseph Dodge explains that “[t]he ideal of neutrality is the notion
that the tax system should not unduly favor one type of economic activity over another,
i.e., economic actors should be able to perform on a ‘level playing field.’” DODGE, supra
note 79, at 287. A neutral tax policy is “presumably ‘allocatively efficient.’” Id. at 288.
162. See SHILLER, supra note 15, at 172.
163. Eric Toder et al., Tax Policy Center Compares Revenue-Raising Options for Deficit
Reduction, TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 23, 2011, available at LEXIS, 2011 TNT 226-39.
164. Hearing, supra note 31 (statement of Dr. Richard K. Green).
165. See id. (citing Dennis R. Capozza et al., Taxes, Mortgage Borrowing, and
Residential Land Prices, in ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 171
(Henry J. Aaron & William G. Gale eds., 1999); DENNIS R. CAPOZZA ET AL., TAXES AND
HOUSE PRICES (1998), available at http://www.umich.edu/~reecon/restate/faculty/
Capozza/tax1097b.pdf). Similarly, in Canada, “[t]he absence of a tax deduction for
mortgage interest probably increases the incentive to pay down debt,” and may explain,
in part, why Canada’s delinquent mortgage loan rate is approximately one-tenth that of
the United States. Alex J. Pollock, Why Canada Avoided a Mortgage Meltdown, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 19, 2010, at A17.
166. Hearing, supra note 31 (statement of Dr. Richard K. Green).
167. See id. This also coincides with economist Mark Zandi’s advice for how to
personally prepare for the next financial crisis—whenever it may come. See ZANDI,
supra note 46, at 243 (“We will all have to save more and be more careful how we
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mortgages will slow debt-driven consumer spending in the overall
economy, that type of spending can become too excessive.168 During
rosy economic periods, many homeowners spend abundantly rather than
pay down tax-privileged mortgage debt.169 For example, many homeowners
during the last housing boom spent 10% more than they took in.170 But
when the housing market crashed and the broader economy floundered,
consumers had to cut personal spending, landing another blow to an
economy accustomed to consumer excess.171 A neutral tax policy that does
not favor mortgage debt will help assuage substantial booms and busts
like those encouraged by the current policy.172
A significant advantage of eliminating the deduction rather than
replacing it with a credit or modifying it is that elimination provides
Congress with the greatest amount of revenue flexibility with which to
lower tax rates, cut the deficit, or invest in more targeted, nontax
homeownership programs.173 If the deduction had been eliminated in
2010, it would have resulted in between $879 billion and $1.26 trillion
in increased revenue over ten years, producing significant revenue to
direct toward the aforementioned purposes.174

invest. Instead of piling into the next new thing, we should be diversifying away from
whatever is appreciating quickly.”).
168. See Hearing, supra note 31 (statement of Dr. Richard K. Green).
169. See ZANDI, supra note 46, at 217–18; see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra
note 152, at 6 tbl.1 (showing consumers’ general propensity to increase spending using
housing wealth).
170. ZANDI, supra note 46, at 218.
171. See id. at 218–19. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that a price
decline of 10% could, by itself, decrease GDP by between 0.4% and 1.4%. CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE, supra note 152, at 12 tbl.2.
172. See Hearing, supra note 31 (statement of Dr. Richard K. Green).
173. If Congress did wish to maintain a small, targeted incentive for homeownership
that only provides a subsidy for those on the cusp of buying a home, one such proposal is
to invest in state-based trust funds that would provide downpayment assistance to
eligible homeowners and share home equity proceeds with the homeowner. See Rick
Jacobus & David M. Abromowitz, A Path to Homeownership: Building a More Sustainable
Strategy for Expanding Homeownership, 19 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY
DEV. L. 313, 316–18 (2010). Jacobus and Abramowitz argue that an advantage of this
approach is that it weeds out homeowners who do not need homeownership assistance
because participants would be required to share the equity in their home with the trust
fund in order to replenish the fund. See id. at 318.
174. TODER ET AL., supra note 121, at 18 tbl.1. The variability in the revenue
projections is due to two things: (1) whether researchers account for behavioral
modifications resulting from the deduction’s elimination, such as selling taxable assets in
order to pay down mortgage debt, and (2) whether current tax policies such as the Bush
tax cuts and patch for the alternative minimum tax are extended. See id. at 8, 18 tbl.1.
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Without a decrease in marginal tax rates—though that is not the object
of this Comment—a strict elimination of the mortgage interest deduction
would result in higher tax liability.175 However, because the mortgage
interest deduction disproportionately favors higher income groups, the
percentage change in after-tax income would affect higher income groups
more greatly than lower and middle income groups.176 If the deduction
were simply eliminated, the average household in the middle-income
quintile earning $43,678 in after-tax income would have an increased
liability of $215, or approximately 0.5%.177 Those in the fourth-highest
quintile earning $71,839 would pay $689 more, a change in liability
of approximately 1%.178 Meanwhile, for households in the ninety-fifth
to ninety-ninth percentile earning $259,935, the increase would be
$4,234, or approximately 1.6% of after-tax income.179
The greatest advantage eliminating the mortgage interest deduction
offers is less housing market volatility and greater affordability in the long
run. For example, eliminating the mortgage interest deduction and
property tax deduction would actually increase the homeownership rate
of young Americans in urban areas because those deductions actually
raise home prices by an amount greater than the decrease in tax liability
they provide.180 In high-cost regions, where the deduction has the greatest
inflationary effect, eliminating the deduction will cause the greatest drop
in home prices.181 In the long run, however, those price decreases will
make owning a home easier in places like California.182
Accordingly, eliminating the mortgage interest deduction will result in
greater market-based allocation of resources and lower, stabilized home
prices in the long run.183 Further, by eliminating the deduction, Congress

The $879 billion figure represents a model with behavior changes and extension of
current policies. Id. at 18 tbl.1. The $1.26 trillion figure represents a model of static
behavior and no extension of current policies. Id.
175. See id. at 19 tbl.2a.
176. See id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. TODER ET AL., supra note 121, at 19 tbl.2a. The largest increase in tax liability
would occur in households in the eightieth to ninety-ninth percentiles. Id. at 16. “The
very highest income taxpayers, however, would experience a relatively small loss in
income because their mortgage costs as a share of income are lower than for other
groups.” Id.; see id. at 19 tbl.2a.
180. Steven C. Bourassa & Ming Yin, Tax Deductions, Tax Credits and the
Homeownership Rate of Young Urban Adults in the United States, 45 URB. STUD. 1141,
1158 (2008), available at http://usj.sagepub.com/content/45/5-6/1141.full.pdf.
181. See RICHARD K. GREEN ET AL., TAXES, MORTGAGE BORROWING AND HOUSE PRICES
22 (1996), available at http://ww.bus.wisc.edu/realestate/documents/culer606.pdf.
182. See Bourassa & Yin, supra note 180, at 1158.
183. See Mathias, supra note 19, at 67.
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would have a significant source of revenue with which to lower tax rates
or decrease the structural budget deficit.184
2. Short-Term Consequences
In the short-run, an immediate elimination of the mortgage interest
deduction would lower home prices and extend economic pain caused by
the burst of the housing bubble, financial crisis, and Great Recession.185
Not surprisingly, considering evidence that the mortgage interest deduction
contributes to housing inflation,186 studies on eliminating the mortgage
interest deduction suggest home prices would drop between 2% and 13%
nationally, with significant variations by region.187 Thus, immediately
eliminating housing subsidies would generally lower home prices and
increase negative equity,188 which would undermine consumer confidence
and spending.189
On a national scale, these “transition losses”190 accompanying a sudden
elimination of the mortgage interest deduction—depending on the timing
of its effective date—could slow appreciation or cause depreciation in the
housing market.191 Even if Congress were to eliminate the deduction in
a comprehensive tax reform package that lowered tax rates and offset the
cost of mortgage interest with lower tax liability, taxpayers would still
begin to divest in housing and shift investments toward more economically
productive assets.192
Further, looking beyond the macroeconomic effects of eliminating the
deduction, many homeowners purchased homes with the expectation

184. See id.
185. See Hearing, supra note 31 (statement of Dr. Richard K. Green).
186. Hilber & Turner, supra note 8, at 6; Steverman, supra note 1.
187. See GREEN ET AL., supra note 181, at 23; Steverman, supra note 1.
188. See Gale, supra note 148, at 119.
189. See ZANDI, supra note 46, at 217.
190. See Logue, supra note 131, at 1133.
191. See Hearing, supra note 31 (statement of Dr. Richard K. Green); see also
Michael P. Devereux, Introduction to THE ECONOMICS OF TAX POLICY 1, 5–6 (Michael P.
Devereux ed., 1996) (discussing the United Kingdom’s phase-out of mortgage interest
tax benefits and the resulting “slump” in property values).
192. See Mathias, supra note 19, at 67. The redistribution of investment to marketbased equilibrium would most obviously harm the real estate development industry,
which opposes making substantial changes to the status quo. See Hearing, supra note 31
(statement of Dr. Robert D. Dietz, Assistant Vice President, National Association of
Home Builders).
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that they could deduct mortgage interest in the future.193 Changing the
subsidy too quickly or dramatically would impose unfair hardship.194 If,
for example, Congress immediately eliminated the deduction without
any related drop in marginal tax rates,195 a household expecting the
deduction would be subject to a dual financial blow: a drop in home
equity and higher tax liability.196 Without lowering marginal rates, that
change would result in $215 in increased tax liability for households
earning about $44,000 in after-tax income.197 For households earning
approximately $72,000 in after-tax income, the change could increase tax
liability by an average of $689.198
Depending on how Congress structured rate cuts in tax reform,
taxpayers may be satisfied with overall lower tax rates and liability but
no mortgage interest deduction.199 For example, the plan put forward by
the Bipartisan Policy Center would change the current tax system,
consolidating the current rate structure—six rates ranging from 10% to
39.6%—to two rates—15% and 27%.200 Those going from a higher rate
to a lower one may forgive not being able to deduct mortgage interest if
the reform delivers overall lower tax liability.201 Thus, fairness and
reliance concerns about ending the deduction could, for many taxpayers,
be addressed by decreases in the marginal tax rate. However, homeowners
would still be subject to a modest decrease in home prices and related

193. See Hearing, supra note 31 (statement of Dr. Richard K. Green).
194. See id. But see Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99
HARV. L. REV. 509, 523–24, 577, 616 (1986) (arguing that taxpayers should not have a
normative expectation that tax policy will never change and that investors should treat
the risk of government policy changes like the risk associated with traditional market
forces—by incorporating it into their overall analysis in deciding whether to make an
investment).
195. This raises a question that cannot be addressed in this Comment: what should
Congress do with the revenue raised by ending the tax preference for mortgage debt?
Depending on how marginal income tax rates are lowered in a comprehensive tax reform
package, these would-be tax increases on those who claimed the mortgage interest
deduction could actually result in lower tax liability or liability somewhere between
current law and these figures. See TODER ET AL., supra note 121, at 19 tbl.2a.
196. See id. (showing that eliminating the mortgage interest deduction would result
in an increase in tax liability for 23.5% of U.S. households).
197. Id. This represents households in the fortieth to sixtieth percentiles for aftertax income. Id.
198. Id. This represents households in the sixtieth to eightieth income percentiles. Id.
199. See Steverman, supra note 1.
200. PETE DOMENICI & ALICE RIVLIN, BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., RESTORING AMERICA’S
FUTURE: REVIVING THE ECONOMY, CUTTING SPENDING AND DEBT, AND CREATING A SIMPLE,
PRO-GROWTH TAX SYSTEM 33 (2010). Although the plan would convert the mortgage
interest deduction to a tax credit, it is used here only to demonstrate rate decreases and
simplification. See id. at 33–34.
201. See Steverman, supra note 1.
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consequences for home equity because the government would no longer
encourage overinvestment in housing.202
3. Appropriate Transition Relief
In eliminating the home mortgage interest deduction, Congress would
be wise to adopt transition relief capable of gradually eliminating the
deduction without shocking the housing market.203 Using transition
policies for tax changes is common,204 and basic methods include phasingin, delaying, or grandfathering a law’s effective date.205 To determine what,
if any, transition relief to provide, policymakers must evaluate the type
of transition losses or windfall gains the new law will likely cause.206
For example, in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Congress disallowed
deductions for investment interest in excess of net investment income but
gradually phased in the disallowance by set percentages for tax years
1987 through 1990.207 A properly structured transition policy can minimize
concerns about eliminating the mortgage interest deduction by preventing a
sudden increase in tax liability for individual taxpayers, minimizing
disruption of the housing market, and reducing the likelihood that
businesses and individuals affected by the change will resist it.208
One proposal is to phase out the mortgage interest deduction by
reducing the cap on qualified residence debt from $1 million by increments
of $100,000 over a ten-year period.209
202. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
203. See Hearing, supra note 31 (statement of Dr. Richard K. Green).
204. In enacting the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Congress used a number of transition
policies to ease tax system changes where necessary. See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Corp. v.
United States, 270 F.3d 135, 136 (3d Cir. 2001) (discussing a provision of the Act
allowing domestic steel companies, which were struggling at the time, to “cash out”
unused investment credits before the credits were repealed); Hosp. Servs. Ass’n of Ne.
Pa. v. United States, 78 Fed. Cl. 434, 435 (2007) (citing Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-514, § 1012, 100 Stat. 2085, 2390) (“[The] Act contained provisions designed
to transition [Blue Cross/Blue Shield] organizations into taxation . . . .”).
205. Logue, supra note 131, at 1134.
206. See id.
207. See I.R.C. § 163(d)(6) (2006). Congress limited the deduction of investment
interest in excess of net investment income to 35% in 1987, 60% in 1988, 80% in 1989,
and 90% in 1990. See id. By 1991, such excesses were entirely disallowed as deductions.
See id.
208. See Charles E. McLure, Jr., Where Tax Reform Went Astray, 31 VILL. L. REV.
1619, 1640–41 (1986).
209. See Hearing, supra note 31 (statement of Dr. Richard K. Green); CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE, PUB. NO. 4212, REDUCING THE DEFICIT: SPENDING AND REVENUE OPTIONS 146

1361

For homeowners, a phase-out would provide time to plan for the decrease
and gradually encourage homeowners to pay down their mortgages more
quickly.210 For the housing market, a phase-out would provide an orderly,
long-range drawdown and affect housing prices slowly, impacting only
the highest-valued homes first.211 Relatedly, phasing out the deduction
provides housing-related industries, such as real estate sales and residential
construction, with adequate time to adjust their business activities.212
An additional benefit of a phase-out is that, like the temporary 2008–
2010 homebuyer tax credit, it might provide current renters looking to
purchase a home with a marginal incentive to do so sooner rather than
later in order to take advantage of the deduction before it disappears.213
On the other hand, because eliminating the mortgage interest deduction
will cause more dramatic decreases in home prices in high-cost regions,214
and those regions would be impacted by a phase-out first, other potential
homeowners might wait to purchase homes until anticipated price
decreases set in.215 Thus, a phase-out might cause some potential
homeowners to purchase a home sooner, whereas others in high-cost
areas might stay on the sidelines in anticipation of noticeably lower
prices following a phase-out.216

(2011), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/120xx/doc12085/
03-10-reducingthedeficit.pdf; Mathias, supra note 19, at 71 n.179.
210. See supra notes 163–65 and accompanying text.
211. See Hearing, supra note 31 (statement of Dr. Richard K. Green).
212. See Mathias, supra note 19, at 71–72 (noting that those industries need “time to
adjust protection because many real estate projects develop over many years”).
213. See Jacobus & Abromowitz, supra note 173, at 335 (noting that Congress
intended the homebuyer tax credit to provide “an immediate economic stimulus to help
prevent further decline in the U.S. housing market”).
214. See PAMELA J. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM:
OPTIONS FOR THE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION 18 (2008) (citing Capozza et al.,
supra note 165, at 190).
215. See Jack Hough, Shopping for a House? Consider Waiting 9 Months, SMART
MONEY (Jan. 29, 2010), http://www.smartmoney.com/invest/markets/shopping-for-ahouse-consider-waiting-6-months/?mg=com-sm (explaining that homebuyers could save
money by waiting to buy a home after a temporary homebuyer tax credit expired because
home prices would drop once government-stimulated demand subsided).
216. See Heather M. Field, Taxpayer Choice in Legal Transitions, 29 VA. TAX REV.
505, 508 n.12 (2010). Delaying the transition to a new tax policy, whether by phasing it
in or delaying the effective date, allows taxpayers to accelerate a deductible activity or
wait until the favorable new law applies. See id. Accordingly, delaying the effective
date of a complete elimination of the mortgage interest deduction could lead to two
scenarios. For example, if Congress decided to delay elimination until 2017, potential
homeowners might accelerate home purchases in order to claim the deduction for their
first few years of ownership. See id. Those potential homeowners should be wary,
however, that the same tax change accelerating their home purchase might temporarily
stimulate demand and increase home prices, minimizing or wiping out the value of the
deduction. See Hough, supra note 215 (discussing similar behavior related to a homebuyer
tax credit). That same phenomenon might cause other potential buyers to wait for the
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A phase-out does yield disadvantages, however, including little revenue
early in the transition decade217 and a sudden end to the deduction for
most homeowners at the end of the decade. First, as an example, if
Congress initiated the phase-out in 2014, gradually eliminating the
deduction would increase revenues by a total of only $14 billion in the
first three years.218 In contrast, the subsequent five years would see a
total of $215 billion in revenue.219 Accordingly, unless Congress structured
tax reform to increase the deficit in the near-term and decrease the
deficit as revenues from the phase-out increased, any tax rate reduction
would have to be more modest at the outset as well.220
Second, as the transition decade reached an end, the phase-out would
affect a broad swath of homeowners whose mortgage debt approximated
the median home price of between $200,000 and $300,000.221 For
example, based on 2009 home values, cutting the cap on the deduction
by $100,000 per year for the first five years will affect fewer than 10%
of U.S. homeowners.222 Meanwhile, in the eighth year alone, the cap
decrease from $300,000 to $200,000 would affect nearly 18% of
homeowners.223 Congress might desire this phase-out structure to place
the most immediate transition losses on those homeowners with the most
expensive homes, delay the impact on those with modestly priced homes,
and postpone the impact on a broad swath of the housing market.224

temporarily high demand and inflationary effect of the mortgage interest deduction to
dissipate after 2017, hoping to buy a home for less. See id.
217. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 209, at 146.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See Mathias, supra note 19, at 72.
221. See U.S. HOME SALE PRICES, supra note 23, at 12. Even at the height of the
housing bubble in 2006, the median home price was only $257,000. See id. at 11.
222. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2009 NATIONAL VALUE, PURCHASE PRICE, AND SOURCE
OF DOWNPAYMENT—OWNER-OCCUPIED UNITS tbl.3-14 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 NATIONAL
HOME VALUE], available at http://www.census.gov/housing/ahs/files/ahs09/3-14.xls.
223. See id.
224. For example, even though New York’s housing market is among the most
expensive in the nation, the 2009 median home value in the metropolitan area was
$400,000. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2009 NEW YORK CITY METROPOLITAN AREA
VALUE, PURCHASE PRICE, AND SOURCE OF DOWNPAYMENT—OWNER-OCCUPIED UNITS
tbl.3-14 (2009), available at http://www.census.gov/housing/ahs/files/newyork09/tab314.xls. An open question is whether a future Congress would get cold feet and halt the
phase-out when it came time for it to “hit” a large group of taxpayers. See, e.g., Peter
Suderman, The Doc Fix: Another Reminder that Congress Can’t Stick to Its Own Deficit
Reduction Plans, REASON.COM HIT & RUN BLOG (Jan. 2, 2013, 1:47 PM), http://reason.
com/blog/2013/01/02/the-doc-fix-another-reminder-that-congre (explaining that in 1997

1363

One alternative would be to decrease the cap according to the percentage
of U.S. owner-occupied homes affected each year. Thus, in the first
year, the cap would be reduced to approximately $500,000, impacting
about 10% of homeowners.225 From there, year-to-year decreases in the
dollar value of the cap would slow as they approached the median home
value in the fifth year.226 Because this approach would affect more
homeowners with high-value deductions sooner in the transition decade,
it would also provide greater revenue up front and more flexibility in
offsetting tax rate decreases.227 This also has the advantage of not back
loading the impact of the phase-out such that it hits a large number of
taxpayers in a one to two year period.
As another alternative, Congress could structure the phase-out to
equalize the revenue impact over a defined period. For example, if the
deduction would result in $879 billion in lost revenue over a ten-year
period,228 Congress could structure the phase-out to raise $87.9 billion
per year over that same period. This would ease rate-reduction planning.
Whether Congress chooses to phase out the deduction by a nominal
amount, by the percentage of homeowners impacted, or in a manner that
equalizes revenues, beginning any phase-out during a weak housing
market may undermine recoveries in the housing market and the broader
economy.229 For that reason, some suggest Congress should adopt additional
transition relief in the form of a trigger tied to the health of the housing
market.230 For example, Richard K. Green proposes that phasing out the
mortgage interest deduction “not begin until the Federal Housing Finance
Agency’s house price index shows year-over-year growth equal to the
rate of consumer price index growth.”231 Creating an automatic trigger

Congress passed a deficit-cutting measure affecting doctors’ reimbursement rates under
Medicare but has not permitted the cuts to go into effect since 2002).
225. See 2009 NATIONAL HOME VALUE, supra note 222, at tbl.3-14.
226. See id.
227. For a discussion of the basic revenue considerations of eliminating the deduction,
see supra notes 173–74 and accompanying text.
228. TODER ET AL., supra note 121, at 6, 18 tbl.1.
229. See Hearing, supra note 31 (statement of Dr. Richard K. Green); see also
Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision,
126 U. PA. L. REV. 47, 87 (1977) (“If the impact on wealth of such a [tax law] change is
large, efficiency and fairness concerns may suggest that phased-in or delayed effective
dates be used to mitigate that impact.”).
230. See Hearing, supra note 31 (statement of Dr. Richard K. Green).
231. Id. Why not just adopt a trigger to completely eliminate the deduction? Like a
delayed effective date, a trigger for immediate elimination of the deduction could
motivate potential homeowners to delay purchases until the inflationary effects of the
deduction wear off. See, e.g., Hough, supra note 215. If potential buyers stay on the
sidelines, lower demand would prolong housing market weakness and thus delay
triggering the deduction’s end.
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for the phase-out serves two purposes.232 First, by delaying initiation of
the phase-out, Congress can avoid “shocking” the housing market as it
only begins to recover from a prolonged slump.233 Second, it ensures
that the new law will gradually go into effect only after sustained growth
occurs rather than on an arbitrary future date.234 Although home prices
are largely seen to have turned the corner in mid-2012, unforeseen
events could trigger another price slide or extremely slow growth—
phenomena the trigger, but not a nominal date, could react to.235
This combined approach to transition—delaying the effective date and
gradually phasing out the deduction—is particularly appropriate where
Congress is concerned about dramatic transition losses affecting efficiency
and fairness, as it should be in eliminating the mortgage interest deduction.236
Although
[r]eliance is generally not considered important when a small change is
enacted . . . [, a]s the magnitude of the change increases, the potential for
significant financial losses also increases, and greater concern is voiced for
those who might have altered their behavior to take advantage of the prior law.
Delayed or phased-in effective dates may reduce the financial impact of such a
change.237

Beyond being gentler to homeowners and the housing market, this
delicate approach does present Congress with certain complications in
reforming the tax code.238 First, the primary disadvantage of delaying
and gradually eliminating the mortgage interest deduction is that it fails
to deliver a large infusion of revenue with which to offset lower tax rates

232. See Hearing, supra note 31 (statement of Dr. Richard K. Green).
233. See id. Again, this sensitivity to a particular industry, business, or sector of the
economy is not unprecedented. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, 270 F.3d
135, 136 (3d Cir. 2001). In 1986, Congress adopted specific language in the Tax Reform
Act to ensure domestic steel companies, to which previous law provided investment
credits, could “cash out” the repealed credits rather than suddenly lose the value of the
credits on their balance sheets. See id.
234. Hearing, supra note 31 (statement of Dr. Richard K. Green). This is
conceptually similar to Peter Orzag’s proposal to link a temporary payroll tax cut to the
unemployment rate. See Peter Orszag, Link U.S. Payroll Tax Holiday to Unemployment
Rate, BLOOMBERG (June 30, 2011, 5:55 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201106-30/payroll-tax-should-be-linked-to-unemployment-rate-peter-orszag.html.
235. Hearing, supra note 31 (statement of Dr. Richard K. Green).
236. See Graetz, supra note 229, at 87.
237. Id. at 78 n.92.
238. See Logue, supra note 131, at 1130 (noting that in tax reform designed to be at least
revenue neutral, limiting “transition relief may be the most obvious way of saving money”).
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or decrease the deficit.239 Second, by tying the effective date to a housing
market trigger rather than adopting a nominal effective date, Congress
would complicate the task of forecasting when even a portion of the
revenue from the deduction’s elimination would become available.240
B. Option 2: Replace the Deduction with a Tax Credit
1. Long-Term Advantages and Disadvantages
There are three advantages to “credifying” tax expenditures such as
the mortgage interest deduction: (1) all qualifying homeowners, whether
they itemize or not, would receive a benefit for mortgage interest,241
(2) the magnitude of the credit’s benefit for each taxpayer would be
transparent,242 and (3) credits provide more progressivity than deductions.243
First, a tax credit is a more equitable policy because taxpayers would not
be subject to the itemization barrier to claim the benefit, as they are with
the deduction.244 As previously discussed, more than a quarter of
homeowners are ineligible to claim the mortgage interest deduction because
their itemized deductions do not exceed the value of the standard
deduction.245 If Congress reconstituted the deduction as a credit, the
benefit could reach lower and middle income, nonitemizing homeowners246
and would provide a greater incentive for renters to purchase a home if
claiming the benefit were a certainty.247 Accordingly, changing the
deduction to a credit would address the itemization aspect of the
deduction’s regressivity.248
Second, tax credits provide a more transparent benefit than tax
deductions because the benefit’s value does not vary by income tax rate.249

239. See id. (discussing revenue complications caused by tax reform transition
relief); supra note 217 and accompanying text.
240. See C ONG . B UDGET O FFICE , P ROJECTING F EDERAL T AX R EVENUES AND THE
EFFECT OF CHANGES IN TAX LAW 4 (1998), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/
files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/10xx/doc1049/taxrev.pdf (discussing the fact that in creating
revenue projections for a future year, the Congressional Budget Office assesses whether
current law provides that certain itemized deductions will be available in that year).
241. TODER ET AL., supra note 121, at 4.
242. Laurence Seidman, How To Clean Up Tax Expenditures: Terminate or ‘Credify,’
TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 12, 2011, available at LEXIS, 2011 TNT 197-8.
243. TODER ET AL., supra note 121, at 5.
244. See id. at 4.
245. See supra text accompanying note 29.
246. MARR & HIGHSMITH, supra note 27, at 6.
247. TODER ET AL., supra note 121, at 4.
248. See MARR & HIGHSMITH, supra note 27, at 7 (“Tax policy ought to lean against
the trend of rising inequality, not exacerbate it.”).
249. Seidman, supra note 242.
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Returning to a previous example,250 Alice and Ben each purchased
homes with $200,000 mortgages at 5% interest, resulting in $10,000 in
interest in the first year. Alice received a $2,800 tax benefit compared to
Ben’s $1,500 benefit because Alice pays a higher tax rate. Under a
mortgage interest credit of 15%, Alice and Ben would receive the same
$1,500 tax benefit because the difference in their respective tax rates
does not affect the value of the benefit.
Third, because taxpayers with higher incomes would not receive
disproportionately larger benefits than those with lower incomes, a
mortgage interest credit restores the progressivity the rate structure was
designed to achieve.251
Despite its advantages over current law, turning the deduction into a
credit also has two primary downsides when compared to eliminating the
mortgage interest deduction: (1) unless the credit is small, it would fail
to substantially broaden the tax base, and (2) it would continue to
incentivize housing investment over more productive assets. First,
transforming the deduction into a credit would undermine the
comprehensiveness of tax simplification and result in less revenue to cut
marginal rates or reduce the deficit.252 Although replacing the deduction
with a 15% tax credit would provide approximately $388 billion over six
years253—a not insignificant amount—it would provide far less than
complete elimination, which would net between $879 billion and $1.26
trillion over ten years.254 Second, because it would continue to provide a
tax subsidy, a home mortgage interest credit would continue to incentivize
investment in housing above other assets.255 Relatedly, because the
credit would make mortgage subsidies more readily available to current
nonitemizers, replacing the deduction with a credit may simply shift the
inflationary effect of the deduction from high-priced residences to less
expensive homes.256

250. See supra text accompanying notes 25–27.
251. See MARR & HIGHSMITH, supra note 27, at 5.
252. See CBO’s Budget Options Report Includes Tax-Related Analysis, TAX NOTES
TODAY, Aug. 7, 2009, available at LEXIS, 2009 TNT 150-22.
253. Id. However, this figure represents a policy of changing to a credit while
gradually lowering the amount of mortgage debt subject to the 15% credit from $1 million to
$500,000. Id. Without gradual lowering of the limit, the revenue projection would be
larger.
254. TODER ET AL., supra note 121, at 6, 18 tbl.1.
255. See CBO’s Budget Options Report Includes Tax-Related Analysis, supra note 252.
256. JACKSON, supra note 214, at 24.
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2. Short-Term Consequences
If Congress replaces the home mortgage interest deduction with a tax
credit that continues to provide all current beneficiaries with mortgage
interest subsidies, transition losses will be significantly lower than under
complete elimination of the deduction.257 Like modifying the deduction
by lowering the cap, replacing the deduction with a credit would more
likely affect high-income earners who could absorb the full cost of
interest on their mortgages more readily than lower and middle income
homeowners.258
3. Appropriate Transition Relief
If structured appropriately, changing homeownership subsidies from a
deduction to a credit could be a form of permanent transition relief for
most homeowners because many would actually see an increase in aftertax income.259 For example, replacing the deduction with a refundable
credit equal to 17.1% of home mortgage interest paid would result in net
income increases for those in the bottom four income quintiles.260
Relatedly, reconstituting the deduction as a credit would primarily increase
tax liability for high-income earners.261 The overall effect on the housing
market would depend on the size of the credit and regional housing
costs.
Although the need for transition relief is much less stark in the context
of replacing the mortgage interest deduction with a tax credit, Congress
could still employ some form of gradual transition relief, such as a phase-in
or trigger.262 Along those lines, the Congressional Budget Office provided
an option to replace the deduction with a 15% tax credit in 2013 and
gradually lower the cap on deductible interest by $100,000 increments
from $1 million in 2013 to a final cap of $500,000.263 Another alternative is
to phase in the credit while phasing out the deduction over five years.264
For example, in the first year, a taxpayer eligible for the mortgage
interest deduction would receive 80% of the value of the deduction and
20% of the value of the new credit.265 The deduction value would decrease

257.
258.
19, at 74.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
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by 20% each year while the credit value would increase by the same
amount until the credit completely eclipses the deduction.266 Like other
phase-outs, this proposal would provide a gradual change for homeowners
and the housing market.267
Phasing out the deduction and gradually replacing it with a tax credit
could also be paired with Green’s housing stability trigger in order to
provide an additional layer of transition relief to avoid shocking the real
estate market.268 A trigger may be problematic, however, if Congress
chooses to replace the deduction with a credit because some potential
homebuyers might put off buying a home until a credit is available.269
For example, a renter looking to buy a home who does not itemize her
taxes might wait for the deduction to become a credit before making a
purchase.270 Accordingly, a triggered credit may keep potential homebuyers
on the sidelines and counterproductively prolong housing market ills.271
Considering this, and the overall low transition losses gradually replacing
the deduction with a credit would cause, Congress should forgo adopting
a trigger alongside a credit.
C. Option 3: Substantially Modify the Deduction
1. Long-Run Advantages and Disadvantages
The last option for changing the mortgage interest deduction is to
modify how the deduction works. The modification with the greatest
budgetary impact would be to reduce the cap on deductible acquisition
debt from its current $1 million level.272 For example, Senator Tom
Coburn proposes decreasing the amount of acquisition debt eligible for
the deduction from $1 million per couple to $500,000 per couple, which
would raise approximately $187 billion over ten years.273 Coburn’s

266.
267.
268.
269.

See id.
See supra notes 209–16 and accompanying text.
See Hearing, supra note 31 (statement of Dr. Richard K. Green).
See Stephanie Armour, Home Sales Fall on Tax Credit Uncertainty, USA
TODAY (Jan. 25, 2010, 11:57 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/
2010-01-25-home-sales_N.htm (demonstrating homebuyers’ reactions to the availability
and unavailability of tax credits for home consumption).
270. See id.; TODER ET AL., supra note 121, at 19 tbl.2a.
271. See Armour, supra note 269.
272. See Coburn Budget Plan Would Scale Back Mortgage Interest Deduction,
supra note 124.
273. Id.
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proposal would also limit the deduction to mortgages on a single residence,
rather than the two permitted under current law, and would eliminate the
deductibility of interest on home equity debt.274 Other proposals involve
lowering the cap, but adjusting the limit regionally to account for local
home prices.275
Lowering the cap on the amount of debt eligible for a deduction would
address one aspect of regressivity—taxpayers purchasing residences
over $500,000 would no longer be subsidized for the portion of their
mortgage between $500,000 and $1 million, as current law permits.276
However, the primary disadvantage of retaining the mortgage interest
subsidy as a deduction is that it would continue to prevent nonitemizing
lower and middle income homeowners from benefitting.277 Further,
although eliminating the deduction for home equity debt would remove a
tax incentive to take on nonacquisition debt, a scaled-back deduction
would still incentivize overinvestment in housing to the detriment of
investment in more productive capital goods.278
2. Short-Term Consequences
Unlike the consequences of eliminating the home mortgage interest
deduction, immediate modification of the deduction would not necessitate
dramatic transition relief because it will likely not affect many
homeowners.279 For example, modifying the deduction by lowering the
cap to $500,000 would result in fewer transition losses than complete
elimination because it would only affect the fewer than 10% of homeowners
whose residences are valued at over $500,000.280 Lowering the cap on
eligible mortgage debt to $500,000 would primarily affect regions with
high-priced markets, such as San Francisco, but to a lesser extent than
274. Id.
275. See John E. Anderson et al., Capping the Mortgage Interest Deduction, 60
NAT’L TAX J. 769, 770 (2007), available at http://www.stanford.edu/~jclemens/Capping_
the_MID.pdf.
276. See HARDAWAY, supra note 15, at 131.
277. See Lepore, supra note 29, at 107–08. The only way to substantially retain the
deduction but eliminate the itemization barrier is to make it an “above-the-line”
deduction, which would allow all homeowners to claim the deduction regardless of
whether their other itemized deductions exceed the standard deduction. See DODGE,
supra note 79, at 14. The obvious downside to this change is increased cost. See Adam
Chodorow, Charitable FSAs: A Proposal To Combine Healthcare and Charitable Giving
Tax Provisions, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1041, 1073–74 (discussing the cost of moving a
different itemized deduction, the charitable giving deduction, above the line).
278. Hearing, supra note 31 (statement of Dr. Richard K. Green).
279. See 2009 NATIONAL HOME VALUE, supra note 222, at tbl.3-14 (showing that of
the 76.4 million housing units in the United States in 2009, only 7.3 million, or just
under 10%, were valued at over $500,000).
280. See id.

1370

[VOL. 49: 1333, 2012]

Transition Relief for Tax Reform’s Third Rail
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

elimination.281 Considering the national median home price was under
$250,000 in 2011,282 the effects of reducing the limitation would primarily
impact those who own expensive homes and would be better able to adjust
to changes in home value or taxation.283 Those homeowners affected by
the reduced cap would still be able to deduct up to $500,000 of qualified
mortgage debt, again resulting in less transition loss than a complete
elimination would produce.284
3. Appropriate Transition Relief
Nonetheless, to prevent shock to the housing market, Congress could
gradually lower the cap and institute a trigger tied to a recovery in home
prices. 285 The Congressional Budget Office, for example, provided
a budget option for reducing the deficit by lowering the cap on the
deduction by $100,000 per year starting in 2013 until it reached
$500,000 in 2018.286 Congress could provide further transition relief by
indexing the cap regionally to account for local home prices.287
V. CONCLUSION: CONGRESS SHOULD PHASE OUT THE MORTGAGE
INTEREST DEDUCTION THROUGH TAX REFORM
The goal of fundamental tax reform is to encourage economic growth,
competitiveness, efficiency, and simplicity. Although eliminating the
mortgage interest deduction may be politically unpalatable at first blush,
“widespread dissemination of certain facts would make it more palatable
to voters,”288 especially when paired with a meaningful cut in tax
rates.289 The home mortgage interest deduction is costly, ineffective,
and economically inefficient, and severely undermines the progressive
structure of the American tax system by lavishing its greatest benefits on
higher income earners who purchase large homes. Further, by contributing
to housing inflation and discouraging Americans from paying down their
281. See Bourassa & Yin, supra note 180, at 1158.
282. U.S. HOME SALE PRICES, supra note 23.
283. See Mathias, supra note 19, at 74.
284. See Coburn Budget Plan Would Scale Back Mortgage Interest Deduction,
supra note 124.
285. See supra notes 209–16, 230–35 and accompanying text.
286. See CBO’s Budget Options Report Includes Tax-Related Analysis, supra note 252.
287. See Anderson et al., supra note 275, at 770.
288. HARDAWAY, supra note 15, at 172.
289. See Steverman, supra note 1.
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mortgage debt, subsidizing housing through the tax code needlessly
continues policies that contributed to the housing crisis from which the
U.S. economy is still recovering.
By gradually eliminating the deduction over a period of years and not
initiating the drawdown of mortgage subsidies until the housing market
exhibits sustained growth, Congress can achieve worthy short-run and
long-run goals. In the short-term, the housing market will be protected
from shock, while current homeowners and incumbent real estate-related
businesses that relied on the existence of the deduction can adjust to its
elimination gradually. In the long run, investment and housing prices
will adjust to market-allocated levels, resulting in more economic
productivity and more affordable housing for future generations.
Eliminating the deduction altogether provides important benefits that
merely modifying the deduction or replacing it with a credit cannot.
Entirely eliminating the deduction provides a maximum infusion of revenue
with which to lower marginal tax rates, decrease the budget deficit, provide
targeted homeownership assistance, or all of the above. Further, a tax credit
or mere modification of the deduction would continue to distort investment
in favor of housing rather than more efficient market-allocated investments.
Eventual elimination increases economic efficiency and productivity and
provides the maximum benefit to the economy and the long-term health
of the American housing market. Nevertheless, even if Congress declined
to completely eliminate the mortgage interest deduction, turning the
deduction into a credit or substantially modifying the deduction would
be superior to current law.
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